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GENDER AND (RELIGIOUS) ATTIRE:  
A MATTER OF (FREE) SPEECH 
 
Alejandro Madrazo 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Both gender and freedom of speech are topics of growing 
importance in Mexico. This is an undeniable observation when 
viewed in the light of constitutional development and debate. In 
recent years, the Mexican Supreme Court has decided a number 
of important cases affecting both gender and freedom of speech.1 
                                                          
* Professor, CIDE Región Centro, Aguascalientes, Mexico. Coordinator of the 
Right to Health Program. LL.B. 2012 at ITAM; LL.M. 2003 and J.S.D. 2006 
at Yale Law School. 
1 For freedom of speech cases, not directly related to sexuality or gender, 
see Comisión federal de telecomunicaciones. El artículo 9o.-A, fracción XVI, 
de la ley federal de telecomunicaciones, al otorgarle facultades exclusivas en 
material de radio y television, no viola los artículos 49 y 89, fracción I, de la 
constitución federal, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme 
Court], Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, Novena Época, tomo 
XXVI, Diciembre de 2007, Tesis P. XXVII/2007, 26/2006, Página 963 
(Mex.); Libertades de expresión e imprenta y prohibición de la censura previa, 
Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Semanario 
Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, Novena Época, tomo XXV, Febrero de 
2007, Tesis 1a. LVIII/2007, 1595/2006, Página 655 (Mex.); Libertad de 
expression y el derecho a la información. Su importacia en una democracia 
constitucional, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme 
Court], Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, Novena Época, tomo 
XXX, Diciembre de 2009, Tesis 1a. CCXV/2009, 2044/2008, Página 287 
(Mex.); Primera Sala SCJN, amparo directo 6/2009, sentencia de 7 de octubre 
de 2009; Medios de comunicación. Su consideración como figuras públicas a 
efectos del análisis a los límites de la libertad de expresión, Pleno de la 
Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Semanario Judicial de la 
Federación y su Gaceta, Décima Época, tomo II, Noviembre de 2011, Tesis 
1a. XXVIII/2011 (10a), 28/2010, Página 2914 (Mex.).  
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 For cases regarding gender, reproduction or sexuality cases, not directly 
related to freedom of speech, see Primera Sala SCJN, acción de 
inconstitucionalidad 146/2007 & 147/2007, sentencia de 24 de abril de 2007; 
Violación. Se integra ese delito aún cuando entre el activo y pasivo exista el 
vínculo matrimonial (Legislación del estado de puebla), Pleno de la Suprema 
Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Semanario Judicial de la 
Federación y su Gaceta, Novena Época, tomo XXIII, Enero de 2006, Tesis 
1a./J. 10/94, 9/2005, Página 658 (Mex.); Divorcio necesario. Cuando se 
ejerce la acción relative con base en la causal de violencia intrafamiliar, en la 
demanda deben expresarse pormenorizadamente los hechos, precisando las 
circunstancias de tiempo, modo y lugar en que ocurrieron, Pleno de la 
Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Semanario Judicial de la 
Federación y su Gaceta, Novena Época, tomo XXV, Enero de 2007, Tesis 
1a./J. 69/2006, Página 173 (Mex.). For an analysis of these cases, 
see Alejandro Madrazo Lajous & Estefanía Vela, The Mexican Supreme 
Court’s (Sexual) Revolution?, 89 TEXAS L. REV. 1863 (2011). And finally, for 
a more comprehensive list of cases, see Sentencias, SUPREMA CORTE DE 
JUSTICIA DE LA NACIÓN,  http://www.equidad.scjn.gob.mx/spip.php? 
page=lista_biblioteca_doc&id_rubrique=161.  
 The Mexican Supreme Court has decided several cases that are related to 
the expression of gender and sexuality. The first, and most prominent, is the 
Amparo Directo Civil 6/2008, in which the Court considered sexual and 
gender identity, and affirmed that the right to freely develop one’s personality 
allows an individual to “project” his or her life “in all ambits of life,” 
including one’s identity. See Primera Sala SCJN, Amparo Directo Civil 
6/2008, sentencia de 14 de mayo 2008, at 90. This line of argument was used 
by the Mexico City Assembly in its defense of same-sex marriage in the 
Acción de Inconstitucionalidad 2/2010. See Acción de inconstitucionalidad. La 
inclusion del artículo 391 del código civil para el distrito federal en el decreto 
de reforma a dicho ordenamiento, publicado en la gaceta official de la entidad 
el 29 de diciembre de 2009, así como su vinculación con un precepto que fue 
modificado en su texto, constituye un Nuevo acto legislative susceptible de 
impugnarse en aquella vía, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] 
[Supreme Court], Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, Novena 
Época, tomo XXXIV, Agosto de 2011, Tesis P. XIX/2011, 2/2010, Página 
869 (Mex.). The Mexico City Assembly argued that marriage is a form of 
freedom of expression both because of its connection to one’s right to freely 
develop one’s personality and contribution to public debate.  The Supreme 
Court decided the case in August 2010. However, the Court did not explicitly 
affirm the expressive dimensions of marriage until 2012 in the Amparo en 
Revisión 581/2012, in which it spoke of the “expressive benefits” of marriage. 
Matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo. Perspectivas para analizar su 
constitucionalidad, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme 
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I have published elsewhere on the intersection of gender and free 
speech, exploring the theoretical and normative implications of 
understanding gender as a form of expression.2 Here, I hope to 
use that earlier work as a platform to address, specifically, the 
question of religious attire in public spaces and its intersection 
with gender equality.  
I propose that we understand gender as a form of expression, 
and second, that we understand religious attire (e.g., head gear 
worn by women belonging to a particular religious group) as not 
only (or mainly) religious attire, but also as attire that expresses 
gender roles. Furthermore, that the main function of freedom of 
speech is the protection and promotion of diversity in speech. 
Starting from these premises, I propose we take the debate over 
religious, female-worn head gear (i.e., head scarves) and recast it 
in terms of freedom of speech. That is, instead of framing the 
issue as one where there is tension between (religious) freedom 
and (gender) equality, the debate can be framed under the free 
speech analytic framework and recast as a tension within free 
speech. On one hand, we have the importance of women’s gender 
expressions; and on the other hand, a state’s interest in promoting 
gender equality. Discussing these issues under the free speech 
                                                          
Court], Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, Décima Época, 
Libro XIX, tomo I, Abril de 2013, Tesis 1a. XCVIII/2013 (10a.), 581/2012, 
Página 965 (Mex.).  
 Lastly, in 2012, the Court decided the Amparo Directo en Revisión 
2806/2012, a case about homophobic expressions. See Primera Sala SCJN, 
Amparo Directo en Revisión 2806/2012, sentencia de 6 de marzo 2013. This 
case is not so much about what can be expressed through one’s gender or 
sexuality, but about what others cannot discern about people’s gender and 
sexuality.   
 I want to thank my colleague, Estefanía Vela, an acute and systematic 
observer of the Court, for keeping all these cases on the radar and, 
specifically, for helping me prepare this footnote. 
2 See Alejandro Madrazo, Género y libertad de expresión, in LIBERTAD 
DE EXPRESIÓN: ENTRE LA TRADICIÓN Y LA RENOVACIÓN. ENSAYOS EN 
HOMENAJE A OWEN FISS 257–87 (Esteban Restrepo Saldarriaga ed., 2013). 
The text was written for a Mexican legal audience, who was unfamiliar with 
both gender studies and the free speech doctrine in the United States. I use 
ample portions of that text here, and I would like to thank Pamela Ruiz Flores 
for her help with the translation of the sections used here. 
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framework allows us to accommodate both a woman’s desire to 
wear religious head gear and the state’s attempt to ban it, while 
simultaneously empowering those same women. 
We tend to discuss the question of whether specific head gear 
used by specific groups (women) within a larger religious 
community (Muslim) should be banned as a tension between 
religious freedom and gender equality. This framework relies on 
some individuals’ beliefs that wearing a headscarf is valuable and 
should be protected by law because it is a religious and 
collectively-held practice. Furthermore, it also assumes that the 
practice of having women wear headscarves disempowers them 
and subjects them to traditional gender roles, undermining gender 
equality. The question between these two sides then becomes 
whether religious freedom should prevail over gender equality.  
The problem with this framework is twofold. First, it sets the 
stage for arbitrary solutions. That is, it requires us to choose 
between one of two incommensurable clashing values: religious 
freedom and gender equality. This dichotomous framework 
provides no common ground to resolve the conflict. Thus, it 
forces a choice that, in the end, is arbitrary: should freedom 
prevail over equality or vice versa? Second, by accepting this 
dichotomous framework, we are put in a position in which, by 
choosing equality over (religious) freedom, we conclude that 
prohibition of attire is an admissible policy. Needless to say, 
prohibiting voluntary conduct by others, which does not harm 
third parties, is always a difficult policy to support or accept. If, 
on the other hand, we choose (religious) freedom over equality 
we run the risk of legitimizing gender oppression yet again. Both 
alternatives disempower the actual women who choose to wear 
religious attire. Choosing equality over religious freedom makes 
gender inequality acceptable in the name of religion. 
Alternatively, choosing religious freedom over equality forces 
these women to be either victims or collaborators of their 
oppressors and disqualifies their choice about how they want to 
live their life and express their gender roles. 
I propose that we instead frame gender as a form of 
expression and attire as a form of gender expression. Using a 
specific understanding of both freedom of speech and gender, we 
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can tackle the question of religious attire in a manner that will 
allow us to resolve the apparent tension between gender equality 
and religious attire in a less arbitrary manner. Rather than simply 
choosing one value (gender equality) over another (religious 
freedom), we can take up the question in a manner that 
empowers—or at least refrains from disempowering—women who 
choose to wear religious attire. I suggest we see religious attire as 
a way women can express their adherence to specific aspects of 
gender roles they adopt and presumably value.  
In Part II, I explain the analytic framework of both free 
speech and gender that I use to address these matters. In Part III, 
I propose that we understand gender as a form of speech and 
discuss the implications of this with regards to the tension 
between religious attire and gender discrimination. Finally, in 
Part IV, I argue that protecting religious attire as a form of 
gender speech better empowers women as opposed to denying 
religious attire constitutional protection in the name of gender 
equality.  
One final word of warning: the platform for this proposal is 
taken from my previous work on the intersection of gender and 
freedom of speech, referenced above. My previous work 
addressed the specific issues of gender and free speech—notably, 
same-sex marriage—in the context of Mexican constitutional 
debates. In that previous work I brought American authors to 
bear on Mexico’s development of free speech and gender debates, 
creating an enriching juxtaposition of constitutional traditions. 
Now, I bring Mexican constitutional cases and debates (along 
with the American authors on which I had previously relied) into 
the American forum, using direct translations from what I found 
pertinent from my previous work instead of refurbishing 
arguments. I do so because I wish to underline, not downplay, the 
origins of what I offer. Therefore, you will find references to 
Mexican law, authors, cases, and in particular, heavy reliance on 
one case (i.e., same-sex marriage as protected under the right to 
free speech). My hope is that this enriches the debate, but most 
important, I hope to avoid any pretention of discussing this issue 
within the confines of an American constitutional debate. Instead, 
I want to underscore that I am a Mexican constitutional scholar 
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engaging with my peers from elsewhere on topics of common 
interest everywhere. 
 
II. UNDERSTANDING GENDER AND SPEECH 
 
This section seeks to explain the understandings of gender and 
free speech from which I approach the question of religious 
attire. It is structured in three parts. First, I define gender and 
flesh out its importance in the debate on the freedom of speech. 
Second, I provide the theoretical and doctrinal framework for the 
fundamental right to freedom of speech, from which I undertake 
my analysis. Finally, I present some of the clichés evident in 
recent academic discussions about freedom of speech in Mexico 
and try to either avoid or contest them. 
 
A. Gender 
 
It is a common trope to define gender in contrast to sex. In its 
simplest form, the distinction tells us that sex refers to the 
physiological differences between men and women, while gender 
refers to the roles or identities constructed, transmitted, and 
expected by society. These roles or identities are linked or 
associated with one sex over another. My sex is male because I 
have certain physiological characteristics that allow me to identify 
as such;3 my gender is masculine because as a child with the 
                                                          
3 Identifying these characteristics is actually much more difficult to 
answer than it initially seems. Laura Saldivia offers a synthesis that illustrates 
the complexity of the problem by pointing out at least eight medically 
distinguishable variables:  
(1) genetic or chromosomal sex, such as XY or XX; (2) 
gonadal sex determined by sexual reproductive glands, like 
the testes and ovaries; (3) internal morphologic sex that is 
determined after three months of gestation, such as seminal 
vesicles, prostate or vagina,  uterus, or fallopian tubes; (4) 
external morphological sex, or genitals, such as penis, 
scrotum, clitoris, or labia; (5) the hormonal sex, such as 
androgens and estrogens; (6) phenotypic sex, or secondary 
sexual characteristics like facial or chest hair; (7) assigned 
sex and gender of rearing; (8) sexual identity.  
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referred physiological characteristics, I was taught to prefer 
football to dolls, the color blue to pink, and later, to sexually 
desire women, not men.  
Therefore, in its simplest form, sex refers to the body, while 
gender refers to the social role, constitutive of an identity, and 
associated with the (sexed) body. The concept of gender emerges 
precisely to avoid the biological determinism of assigning social 
roles as a function of differences in reproductive physiology. In 
this regard, Professor Joan Scott tells us: 
In its most recent usage, “gender” seems to have 
first appeared among American feminists who 
wanted to insist on the fundamentally social quality 
of distinctions based on sex. The word denoted a 
rejection of the biological determinism implicit in 
the use of such terms as “sex” or “sexual 
difference.” “Gender” also stressed the relational 
aspect of normative definitions of femininity. 
Those who worried that women’s studies 
scholarship focused too narrowly and separately on 
women used the term “gender” to introduce a 
relational notion into our analytic vocabulary. 
According to this view, women and men were 
defined in terms of one another, and no 
understanding of either could be achieved by 
entirely separate study.4 
Consequently, discussing gender and not sex—as does the 
Mexican Constitution in the fifth paragraph of Article I5— 
emphasizes the social dimension, as opposed to the purely 
                                                          
Laura Saldivia, Reexaminando la construcción binaria de la sexualidad, Paper 
Presented at the Seminario en Latinoamérica de Teoría Constitucional y 
Política (SELA) (2009), (forthcoming in “Seminario”) (manuscript at 4), 
available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/student_organizations/ 
sela09_saldivia_sp_pv.pdf (translated by author). None of these variables 
seems necessary or sufficient. See id. 
4 Joan W. Scott, Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis, 91 
AM. HIST. REV. 1053, 1054 (1986).  
5 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as 
amended Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO] , 5 de Febrero de 1917, art. I. 
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biological, of dividing people into men and women. The use of 
the term gender does not exclude biology; but rather, it 
encompasses issues that go beyond it. In addition, gender refers 
to the relational character (that is, that gender roles are defined in 
relation to one another) of assigned social roles based on 
biological differences (mainly concerning reproductive 
capabilities). Gender and social roles are important for both men 
and women. Understanding the role of any one sex’s gender roles 
requires comprehension of both. Therefore, I agree with 
Professor Scott when she says that in the dominant social 
scientific discourse, 
[t]he term gender becomes a way of denoting 
“cultural constructions”- the entire social creation 
of ideas about appropriate roles for women and 
men. [T]he use of gender emphasizes an entire 
system of relationships that may include sex, but is 
not directly determined by sex or directly 
determining of sexuality.6 
 However, the distinction between biology (sex) and social 
construction (gender) is not as sharp as it looks. The growing 
visibility of transsexuality and intersexuality directly controverts 
the distinction: sex has a strong component in social 
construction.7 We assign sex depending on how we interpret the 
body, sometimes literally intervening in the body itself and 
constructing one sex. For instance, when an infant has ambiguous 
sexual characteristics (a smaller penis than average, a clitoris 
larger than average, penis and labia, or a long list of 
possibilities), we intervene. Parents will then often decide which 
                                                          
6 Scott, supra note 4, at 1056–57. 
7 Transsexuality refers to a person changing his or her sex (from male to 
female or vice versa), who assumes the primary or secondary physiological 
sexual characteristics, conduct, and behaviors of the opposite sex. This does 
not necessarily question the binary distinction between the sexes, but rather 
questions whether the distinction is necessarily fixed. By contrast, 
intersexuality refers to people who do not completely fit into the physiological 
categories of male or female, and therefore resist the dominant binary 
classification of their physical bodies. See Saldivia, supra note 3, at 5. 
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of two socially accepted options—male or female—the body of 
the infant will be adjusted to. This is done by removing—through 
surgery, hormone treatment, or some other means—the 
characteristics that are not of the chosen sex. The concepts of 
transsexuality and intersexuality controvert the discrete and 
binary frame in which all people can be classified as male or 
female. These phenomena demand that the conceptual apparatus 
of two discrete categories of male and female yield to either a 
gradual understanding in which there are multiple possibilities 
between these two poles, or else both poles are rejected for not 
adequately representing the reality of certain bodies and certain 
people. 
For the purposes of this piece, I will not address in detail the 
implications of transsexuality and intersexuality on the analytical 
contraption through which we strive to understand the body and 
social relations. I will also not explore thoroughly the theoretical 
and normative implications—multiple and deep—of renouncing 
the use of discrete and binary categories that now prevail in our 
law. To the extent that transsexuality and intersexuality challenge 
the established categories of gender and sex, they should be 
considered as an expression of gender or as a gender expression. 
To be, or to be understood, as a transsexual expresses something 
in the same way that being or understanding one’s self as a 
heterosexual man expresses something. If someone refuses to be 
labeled explicitly as a specific gender, that refusal is an 
expression about gender. The most relevant aspect of 
transsexuality and intersexuality is what they tell us about the 
distinction between gender and sex for the purposes of free 
speech. Namely, that social construction is more important than it 
initially appears and that physiology is also a function of the 
cultural interpretations we make of the body. In this sense, 
transsexuality and intersexuality reinforce the importance of 
gender as a social construction and, thus, as an expression of 
what gender is or should be. 
The social dimension—as opposed to the merely biological—
and the relational character of gender are two important elements. 
A third important feature of the gender category is its necessarily 
political dimension. Foucault noted and analyzed the historical 
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and discursive construction of sexuality.8 He argued that 
discourses that are generated around sexuality establish multiple 
and diverse power relations between people. The same happens 
when we talk about gender. Moreover, gender can be understood, 
among other things, as one such type of field, which has sprouted 
around the study of sexuality, as well as one of the specific 
categories that have been incorporated into different disciplines 
(history, political science, medicine, law, etc.). The important 
thing is that gender—practices, symbols, ideas, customs, 
activities, artistic expressions, legal, and political or religious 
doctrines, regarding gender—produces power relationships 
between people.  
 
 B. The Theoretical Framework of Freedom of Speech 
 
The future of constitutional interpretation of freedom of 
speech in the Mexican judiciary is uncertain.9 In a relatively short 
period, the Mexican Supreme Court has issued a number of 
opinions about the freedom of speech10 that are noteworthy in 
their theoretical dispersion and methodological inconsistency. 
Some opinions virtually extinguish freedom of speech,11 while 
                                                          
8 See generally 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 
(Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1976). 
9 Santiago J. Vázquez Camacho, Introduction to LIBERTAD DE 
EXPRESIÓN: ANÁLISIS DE CASOS JUDICIALES XXVII (Santiago J. Vázquez 
Camacho ed., 2007).   
10 See cases cited supra note 1. 
11 The most famous case was the ruling of the Primera Sala de la Suprema 
Corte in the legal protection in review 2676/2003, better known as the case of 
“El Poeta Maldito” that Sergio Witz issued in October 2005. Primera Sala 
SCJN, amparo en revisión 2676/2003, sentencia de 5 de octubre de 2005. In 
that case, the majority concluded that the existence of a constitutionally 
protected entity (patriotic symbols) should be interpreted, ipso iure, as a limit 
to freedom of expression.  
 As rightly pointed by Francisa Pou, the Court deemed Witz’s poem 
punishable under criminal law, even though:  
[T]here could not be a better example of what is often 
considered the core type of speech protected by the 
Constitution. That was a case of linguistic expression, not 
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others are progressive and demand that the State concern itself 
with improving the public debate about freedom of speech and its 
constitutional partner, the right to information.12 It is thus 
                                                          
nonlinguistic or “symbolic” expressive behavior, as in the 
famous examples of burning American flags, books or 
crosses. The latter is generally analyzed as a regulation of 
expression, not a regulation of the conditions of the freedom 
of expression, as when discussing the influence of money in 
election campaigns, which is a regulation of expressive 
content. That is not simply a form and manner of expression, 
but rather one of indubitable political dimension. The 
expression had no individualized addressee, which excluded 
the need for complex weighing of judgments between 
freedom of expression and other fundamental rights of 
individuals (i.e. honor, privacy). The expression moved 
through an extremely classical channel, such as print media, 
and not a medium that stimulated discussion, such as 
television . . . . Finally, the case concerned the speech of an 
individual, not a subject with a less defined constitutional 
status (interest groups, legal people, cultural communities). 
Francisca Pou, El precio de disentir, in LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN: ANÁLISIS DE 
CASOS JUDICIALES XXVII 187–88 (Santiago J. Vázquez Camacho ed., 2007) 
(translated by author). If Witz’s poem does not find that that type of expression 
deserves constitutional protection under the freedom of expression, it is 
difficult to imagine what kind of expression does deserve it. 
12 Known as the “Televisa Law,” case 26/2006, the Supreme Court, 
sitting en banc, issued the final portion of its Fifteenth Considerando on June 
7th, 2007. See Comisión federal de telecomunicaciones. El artículo 9o.-A, 
fracción XVI, de la ley federal de telecomunicaciones, al otorgarle facultades 
exclusivas en material de radio y television, no viola los artículos 49 y 89, 
fracción I, de la constitución federal, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia 
[SCJN] [Supreme Court], Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, 
Novena Época, tomo XXVI, Diciembre de 2007, Tesis P. XXVII/2007, 
26/2006, Página 963 (Mex.). The supermajority opinion explicitly discussed 
the function of the State as guarantor of the freedom of expression and the 
citizen’s right to information, which is a function that involves the obligation 
of the State to foster plurality and diversity in communication in order to 
achieve a society “more integrated, more educated and chiefly, more just.”  
 It is important to note that there are good reasons to be optimistic about 
the Court’s opinion on freedom of expression. It shows the underlying 
understanding of such an important fundamental right as having more weight 
in the evolution of the Court’s constitutional doctrine than the “damned Poet” 
precedent. First, the ruling is more recent. Second, it is a supermajority ruling 
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impossible to predict or generalize the Court’s treatment of 
freedom of speech. Whether the State takes the role of a censor 
or as a protector of the diversity of expressions that reach the 
public forum, its role in relation to freedom of speech has not 
been understood by the Mexican Court to be a passive one. While 
much remains undefined, what is clear is that—at least in 
Mexico—the borders of the fundamental right to free speech are 
defined by the function of its political and instrumental role; that 
is, its role as an instrument for collective self-government.  
Given the embryonic nature of a judicially generated 
constitutional doctrine around freedom of speech in Mexico, the 
theoretical framework that achieves the objective of this piece 
must be found elsewhere. Unfortunately, discussion of the 
constitutional doctrine on freedom of speech from Mexican 
academic circles is not particularly wide or rich. Undoubtedly, 
the recent decisions of the Mexican Court have generated 
academia’s interest in the subject, but there is no existing home 
grown theoretical framework sufficient to support the exploration 
of gender as an expression in the way this article contends.13 For 
                                                          
by the Court sitting en banc, in contrast with a simple majority achieved in a 
Chamber. The ruling in Televisa Law was unanimous. Finally, the reaction 
and criticism from the legal community on the first ruling, and the 
overwhelming acceptance and celebration of the second one, should be read by 
the Court as an indicator of the quality of both rulings.  
 Further, the First Chamber seems to have honed its own criteria to issue a 
ruling in November 2006 in amparo 1595/2006. Libertades de expresión e 
imprenta y prohibición de la censura previa, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de 
Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su 
Gaceta, Novena Época, tomo XXV, Febrero de 2007, Tesis 1a. LVIII/2007, 
1595/2006, Página 655 (Mex.). While it does not paint the Court as 
progressive as the Court was in Televisa Law, it does speak of a more sensible 
and serious First Chamber than in the case of the “dammed Poet.” 
13 Recently, authors have published several papers about freedom of 
expression that discuss the rulings of the Court referred supra note 1 on the 
compilation of Santiago Vazquez or Electoral Tribunal judgments. See, e.g., 
Alejandro Madrazo Lajous, Los límites a la libertad de expresión, in 1 
COMENTARIOS A LAS SENTENCIAS DEL TRIBUNAL ELECTORAL, Número 1 
(2008). Or, the discussion has revolved around increasing visibility for 
constitutional issues. See, e.g., Pedro Salazar Ugarte & Rodrigo Gutiérrez 
Rivas, El derecho  a la libertad de expresión frente al derecho a la no 
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the purposes of this piece, the theoretical framework articulated 
by Professor Owen Fiss is useful.  
Fiss questions the assumption that state censorship is a threat 
against which the fundamental right of free speech is erected.14 
Without denying the role of oppressor that a state can play against 
individuals who wish to express something, Fiss proposes that the 
state can also play the role of guarantor for the freedom of those 
same individuals. This is possible for two reasons.  First, it is not 
only the state that can keep the individual from expressing 
herself; private power can also render individuals mute. Second, 
in Fiss’s understanding, the values that freedom of speech 
protects are eminently social, not individual. If a state values 
speech (and demonstrates as much in its Constitution), it is not 
because discourse is a form of self-expression or self-
actualization, but rather because it is essential for collective self-
determination, and therefore, to democracy.15 
Against the conception of freedom of speech that Fiss labels 
“libertarian”16—freedom of speech protected as a form of self-
expression, valuable in itself—Fiss proposes we adopt a 
democratic conception. Under such a conception, the purpose of 
free speech is to enrich and amplify the scope of public debate in 
order to allow ordinary citizens to know the issues that must be 
addressed and the arguments supporting the various positions 
around them. 
                                                          
discriminación, in IIJ-UNAM Y CONSEJO NACIONAL PARA PREVENIR LA 
DISCRIMINACIÓN (2008). But most of the legal doctrinal work that deals with 
freedom of expression remains within textbooks about individual rights that are 
several decades old. I think the relevant academic analysis about freedom of 
expression in our country has just begun, and there is not yet doctrinal critical 
mass to build a robust and fertile theoretical framework that facilitates the 
construction and analysis of the constitutional judicial doctrine in this field. 
14 See OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 1–4 (1998). 
15 “Speech is valued so importantly in the Constitution, I maintain, not 
because it is a form of self-expression or self-actualization but rather because it 
is essential for collective self-determination.” Id. at 3. In considering gender as 
an expression, I think the goal of this Article is to contribute to the discussion 
of Fiss’s position. Unfortunately, due to space restrictions, I will undertake 
this analysis in a future piece. 
16 Id. 
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If Fiss is right and a democratic conception of freedom of 
speech is the correct interpretation, then the state can have two 
distinct roles. First, it can play the role of censor, in which case 
the fundamental right to freedom of speech is a mechanism to 
prevent or stop certain abuse of political power. Second, it can 
play the role of promoter of vigorous public debate when powers 
different from the state are the ones censoring. In that case, the 
state must intervene to ensure that the weak are not silenced by 
the powerful. 
Fiss tells us17 that the U.S. Supreme Court initially decided 
cases involving freedom of speech by balancing the value of 
freedom (e.g., freedom of speech) against some counter-value 
(e.g., national security, the right to privacy and honor of the 
citizens, etc.). Under the libertarian model we would explain the 
conflict as a contest between two values which need to be 
balanced. If a value other than freedom prevails, a limit to 
freedom of speech exists that excludes certain types of speech 
from constitutional protection. 
What are the consequences of adopting the democratic 
conception?18 The problem with an approach which balances 
value and counter-value is that, when the counter-value has the 
same constitutional status as the value, the balance between the 
values becomes sterile casuistry and impossible to resolve by 
application of general principles. It therefore becomes, to some 
extent, arbitrary. Such is the case, for example, when the counter 
value is equality in the form of the fundamental right to 
nondiscrimination. Under the libertarian conception, it would be 
necessary, at some point, to choose between the freedom of the 
discriminator who uses his or her freedom of speech to 
discriminate, and the discriminated subject’s right to equality. 
Fiss rightly proposes that under the democratic model, we can 
characterize the dichotomy in a more fruitful way: not as a 
conflict between freedom and equality, but rather as a conflict 
between freedom and freedom.19 The balancing then would take 
                                                          
17 Id. at 5. 
18 Id. at 3. 
19 Id. at 15. 
2014.05.01 MADRAZO.DOCX 5/5/2014  1:53 PM 
 GENDER AND (RELIGIOUS) ATTIRE 567 
place between two competing manifestations of the same value 
(free speech), and thus can be resolved starting from a common 
ground and seeking to achieve a common purpose: the 
enhancement of that value.  
Fiss observes that the problem of discriminatory speech, for 
example, is not only that such speech infringes on the value of 
equality—i.e., the fundamental right to nondiscrimination—but 
that it also has the consequence of “silencing” those who are 
discriminated against (or those who are excluded, slandered, 
etc.), impoverishing collective deliberation.20 Those who are 
discriminated against are effectively excluded from participating 
in the public debate, either because they are not heard or because, 
if they are heard, their voice is not valued because they have been 
previously disqualified. Fiss calls this the silencing effect of 
speech.21 But the silencing effect of speech does not only occur in 
cases in which the content of one person’s speech mutes the 
speech of others. It is also present in cases where, because the 
media through which competing discourses are expressed is 
asymmetric, the plurality of opinions is undermined. Asymmetric 
access to media has the effect of marginalizing one party’s speech 
making it effectively inaudible.22 Thus, plurality of opinions 
                                                          
20 Id. at 16. 
21 Id. at 16–18. 
22 Mexico has recently considered this in the case of Ley Televisa. See 
Comisión federal de telecomunicaciones. El artículo 9o.-A, fracción XVI, de 
la ley federal de telecomunicaciones, al otorgarle facultades exclusivas en 
material de radio y television, no viola los artículos 49 y 89, fracción I, de la 
constitución federal, Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme 
Court], Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, Novena Época, tomo 
XXVI, Diciembre de 2007, Tesis P. XXVII/2007, 26/2006, Página 963 
(Mex.). When the Court deliberated this case, Televisa and TV Azteca, the 
two main national broadcast television companies who were the most interested 
in the outcome of the ruling, broadcasted many notes accusing the Supreme 
Court as being “Chavista” (referring to Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez) 
and totalitarian. During its public deliberations, the Supreme Court was 
already outlining the defeat of television companies. The two senators who led 
the challenge to the law were accused of being, in one case, corrupt agents of 
foreign interests and, in another, a murderer.  
 However, the court and senators are far from being vulnerable groups. 
The court had media available, like Judicial Channel, and the Senate had 
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diminishes and public debate is rendered less robust. 
The important aspect of the democratic model is that freedom 
of speech becomes an instrumental right with the immediate 
objective of ensuring inclusive public deliberation. This public 
deliberation is political because its goal is to enable collective 
self-government. The state is constitutionally entitled to 
intervene, restricting a speaker in order to contain the silencing 
effect of his or her speech.  The state is entitled to do so in the 
name of freedom of speech per se, not on behalf of another value 
or in spite of free speech. When the state intervenes in this way, 
it plays a role analogous to that of a parliamentary moderator: it 
removes someone from the podium so that others can now have 
access. This allows the plurality of speech to be enhanced and the 
robustness of public debate is aggrandized. 
 
 C. Common Tropes 
 
Some of the tropes frequently used in discussions about 
freedom of speech are, I believe, counterproductive. The first 
trope establishes that there are different types of speech, and that 
the classification of speech under a particular category is central 
to determining if it is constitutionally protected. According to this 
notion, certain categories of speech are protected while others are 
not (or not as well) because some types of speech are more 
valuable than others.23 However, freedom of speech does not 
                                                          
extensive coverage in print media and some coverage on radio and cable 
television. But the difference between the ability of the court or senators to 
communicate with the two main national television networks was so abysmal 
that it had the effect of silencing these broadcasters from a large proportion of 
the national population. 
23 For example, in Mexico, Juan Antonio Cruz Parcero argues that there 
are categories of privileged discourse: artistic, political and religious 
discourse: “[T]here are especially three aspects of these freedoms that are at 
all times crucial in a free society. Freedom to manifest religious beliefs and 
political ideas, and one generally ignored in the theoretical writings: freedom 
of artistic creation, that is, to manifest artistically.” Juan Antonio Cruz 
Parcero, De poemas, banderas, delitos y malas decisiones. La sentencia de la 
Suprema Corte sobre el caso Witz, 245 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE 
DERECHO DE MEXICO 423, 430–31 (2006) (translated by author). He also 
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protect speech in and of itself.  Instead, speech is protected by 
establishing a fundamental right because it has a specific function 
namely ensuring that diverse issues and positions are not 
suppressed from public deliberation. The exercise of classifying 
speech into different types of speech has the effect of prejudging 
which discourses contribute to public deliberation.  
For example, society tends to accept that religious discourse 
deserves more protection than “obscene” speech (a category of 
speech which has historically been denied constitutional 
protection).24 At first glance, it is not clear why society should 
presume that a theological doctrine is of necessarily greater value 
than a pornographic image. Imagine the possibility that a 
theological proposition contributes little or nothing at all to 
cultural, political, social, or theological discussions. As a 
hypothetical, imagine a Roman Catholic individual arguing in 
favor of adopting the thesis of the immaculate conception of 
Mary, which has been part of Catholic Church dogma since the 
nineteenth century. The matter is quite settled for Catholics and 
quite irrelevant to almost all other groups, so positing the dogma 
contributes little to current public deliberation. In contrast, 
suppose a pornographic image provides a new perspective on how 
to enjoy healthy eroticism for thousands of people. For example, 
feminist pornography, or post-porn, both of which challenge the 
male-dominating discourse of commercial pornography without 
sacrificing the celebration of eroticism. Why would we hold that 
an argument in favor of the Immaculate Conception is inherently 
worthier than feminist pornography, a priori? In a case having to 
choose between guarding—by either protecting or promoting—
one discourse over another, it would be rather more sensible to 
look at what each contributes to today’s individuals and/or 
today’s society in the existing historical and cultural context. 
Moreover, prejudging based on the topic rather than the 
                                                          
argues that “freedom of artistic creation is a way to express ideas that deserves 
special protection, that a human being can express themselves artistically is 
considered something intrinsically valuable . . . .” Id. at 443. 
24 See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 
(1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).  
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substance impedes an analysis of the effects of specific speech 
and consequently on what that speech brings to democratic 
deliberation. Of course, it is easier to have categories into which 
speech can be classified and then, depending on its classification, 
afford it greater or lesser protection. But this type of 
categorization contributes little to collective deliberation because 
it diminishes the potential for understanding and interpretation. It 
is important not to focus on what kind of speech is granted or 
denied protection.  Instead, it is important to ask what that speech 
contributes to the public discourse. The latter cannot be known a 
priori and therefore it should not matter if the message falls into a 
particular category of speech. It should matter who and under 
what circumstances the message is offered. 
A second trope is that speech is different from action. This is 
not commonly accepted in U.S. Constitutional doctrine, but it is 
taken for granted elsewhere.25 Contrary to what this trope 
assumes, I hold that what is relevant is not the means by which 
we express ourselves—language, symbols, pictures, objects, 
actions, silence—but whether we are actually communicating 
something. Marching, burning a flag, boycotting a product—
these are all forms of expression. Expressions, whatever form 
they may take, contribute to public discourse. 
The third trope is the notion that freedom of speech is a right 
enforceable against the state.26 Historically, freedom of speech 
                                                          
25 For example, Francisa Pou quotes Paul Salvador saying that what is 
spoken and what is written is as different from the facts as “spirit is from 
matter.” Pou, supra note 11, at 188. However, the distinction between words 
and actions is becoming less relevant in the field of freedom of speech. The 
classic example is saying the word “fire” to a firing squad, which is no longer 
the exception to the rule. In an information society, words and actions are 
increasingly confused. For American constitutional doctrine that accepts 
freedom of speech protection for expressive conduct, see, for example, United 
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) and Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 
(1989).  
26 American constitutional doctrine still holds that all fundamental rights 
are justiciable against the State, but another constitutional doctrine recognizes 
that such a right protects against private citizens as well. In considering free 
speech, however, the idea of the State as the only censor is still prevalent 
outside the U.S. Once again, Pou quotes Paul Salvador maintaining that a key 
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may have originated as an effort to protect political dissidents 
from government violence. However, the genealogy of this 
fundamental right does not seem reason enough to limit its 
function. Today, oppression of private citizens by private power 
is more visible (and maybe more common). Private media can 
shut out a message; it can discredit a messenger; and it can 
project a specific message with a force unparalleled in the past. In 
the large political communities in which we live, private mass 
media is an example of a particularly important vehicle of 
communication and a particularly salient source of the silencing 
effect of speech.27 It may be that private power can be deemed a 
more dangerous censor than public authority.  
This last point is crucial. It has become a widely accepted 
thesis that large private powers are a potential threat to freedom 
of speech, but this is accepted by analogy with the State.28 
Namely that those who represent a threat to freedom of speech 
are the people or organizations who provide a public service 
(e.g., radio broadcasting), or are an economic power that has a 
disproportionate influence over the state, market, society, or all 
of the above.  For example, a company or group of companies 
may monopolize basic services such as telephone services. Or 
else, a historic entity that having rivaled the state still holds sway 
over large portions of the populations—for instance, the Catholic 
Church. In all of these cases, the State as a paradigmatic censor 
remains near at hand in the imagination. We need to broaden our 
understanding of censorship by private actors in order to address 
some of the most ordinary forms of censorship at play in gender.  
If we seriously consider that freedom of speech does not 
                                                          
premise of freedom of speech is that it has to protect those who “individually 
confront the established power, preferably the public, but also the private 
power.” Pou, supra note 11, at 188–89. 
27 Fiss, supra note 14, at 5–26. 
28 For example, Pedro Salazar Ugarte and Rodrigo Gutierrez Rivas make 
this point, referring explicitly to the potential of actual private violators of 
freedom of speech in Mexico: the major economic powers, the media, 
multinational corporations, and criminal groups. They probably would not 
object to including noneconomic powers like churches, but they seem to have 
in mind a power similar to that of the State in some way. Ugarte & Rivas, 
supra note 13, 6–7. 
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protect speech itself without qualification, but instead protects the 
plurality and diversity of speeches for inclusion in political 
deliberation, then we have to unmoor ourselves from the 
dominant paradigm. I propose broadening our perspective of what 
constitutes an agent that is capable of impinging upon freedom of 
speech to include not only private agents who have 
disproportionate power in absolute terms, but also to those 
private agents who have disproportionate power relative to the 
silenced speaker.29 For example, a man who believes that women 
are obligated to carry to term an unwanted pregnancy may not 
have a silencing effect on the candidate for public office that is 
running on a pro-choice platform, but may be able to silence his 
wife in a conversation with her pregnant daughter to decide 
whether she travels to Mexico City to terminate an unwanted 
pregnancy.30 This expanded understanding of the censor may be 
irrelevant when discussing the regulation of political propaganda 
or the use of the electromagnetic spectrum for broadcast, but it is 
important when addressing gender. 
 
III. GENDER AS EXPRESSION AND GENDER EXPRESSIONS 
 
Gender should be understood as a form of expression. There 
are two different perspectives underlying the policy implications 
for understanding gender as a form of expression: gender 
constitutionally protected as expression, and gender as a form of 
expression that limits another’s expressions about gender. 
 
A. Gender as Expression 
 
In order to understand in what sense gender is a form of 
                                                          
29 For example, Salazar and Gutiérrez would easily coincide, since they 
rely in a relational conception of power and freedom when they explain how 
private agents may treat freedom of speech. See id. at 6–7. 
30 I do not suggest that the State should intervene directly between private 
parties, but I want to illustrate the silencing effect. I will conclude that privacy 
interests outweigh freedom of speech in a case like this one, but it does not 
mean that a silencing effect is not present. I thank Estefanía Vela Bara for 
suggesting that I clarify this idea. 
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expression, it is necessary to understand what is meant when the 
term “gender” is used on a daily basis. Professor Joan Scott’s 
work is helpful in this understanding. After analyzing the 
historical evolution of the use of the concept of gender, Scott 
presents a rich and complex conception of gender using two 
propositions that help to understand gender as an expression: 
“The core of the definition rests on an integral connection 
between two propositions: gender is a constitutive element of 
social relationships based on perceived differences between the 
sexes, and gender is a primary way of signifying relationships of 
power.”31 
The first proposition—gender as a constitutive element of 
social relationships—is split into four elements, analytically 
distinct but closely related.32 The first of these elements is made 
of “available symbols that evoke multiple (and often 
contradictory) representations.”33 Scott uses Eve and Mary as 
examples of the Western Christian traditional gender symbols.34 
The second element is the “normative concepts” that guide the 
interpretation of these symbols, checking and limiting their 
possible interpretations. 
These [normative] concepts are expressed in 
religious, educational, scientific, legal, and 
political doctrines and typically take the form of a 
fixed binary opposition, categorically and 
unequivocally asserting the meaning of male and 
female, masculine and feminine. In fact, these 
normative statements depend on the refusal or 
repression of alternative possibilities, and, 
sometimes, overt contests about them take 
place . . . . The position that emerges as dominant, 
however, is stated as the only possible one. 
Subsequent history is written as if these normative 
positions were the product of social consensus 
                                                          
31 Scott, supra note 4, at 1067. 
32 Id.  
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
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rather than of conflict.35 
This second element is particularly relevant to freedom of 
speech. Specifically, with regard to the “normative concepts” or 
symbols, Scott proposes these concepts, which include legal, 
political, and religious doctrines, among others, that tell us how 
the interpretations of those symbols should be—or more 
precisely—how they can be interpreted.36  These dominant 
normative concepts contrast and suppress other possible 
interpretations of such symbols, naturalizing the interpretative 
possibilities that prevail. This means that the interpretation of 
symbols is forged by contrasting interpretive alternatives, which, 
if one comes to be dominant over the others, can suppress the 
other symbols. What is at stake then is the interpretation of 
symbols that tells us what we are as men and women (and, in 
addition that we are men or women), and what we should be as 
men or women. Gender consists, in part, of an interpretation that 
seeks hegemony and suppresses different interpretations about 
what we are. In gender, we are in the field of discourse, and 
more specifically, a discourse to be imposed as a fixed fact that 
displaces alternatives. 
The third element Scott describes is the social institutions and 
organizations that adopt and reproduce the interpretation of the 
symbols that are presented as fixed and as a product of 
consensus, when they really are not. Scott speaks of, at least, 
four institutions in which this takes place: kinship, work, 
education, and government.37 
A fourth element is the subjective identity. The symbols, the 
indications of how we should interpret them (that is, the 
normative concepts), and the social institutions that adopt and 
reproduce these interpretations all have a direct impact on how 
we come to understand ourselves.   
This understanding of gender enables one to see the intimate 
link between freedom of speech and gender. Gender is formed by 
a cluster of expressions: symbols, doctrines that tell us how to 
                                                          
35 Id. at 1067–68.  
36 Id. at 1067. 
37 Id. at 1068. 
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interpret these symbols, institutions, and organizations that 
require us to accept those symbols and ideas about ourselves, and 
reinforce the workings of the cluster as a whole. Gender is one of 
the forms of speech that permeates through us and connects us 
with each other; gender infuses our institutions, our doctrines, 
and our symbols with meaning, and constitutes our subjective 
identities. When one acts according to one’s gender role, one 
draws meaning from symbols and doctrines associated with that 
role. One uses that meaning in order to act within basic social 
organizations and institutions—such as family, school, religion, 
or government—and thereby confirms and reaffirms such 
meanings by understanding one’s self through the resulting 
interpretative framework. Gender, like expression, and like 
discourse in general, provides meaning and defines persons, 
institutions, relations, and symbols. Dressing a newborn in blue 
says something of what is expected of him, of what, starting then, 
he is. That act conveys a message to him, and to the rest of us. 
Professor Scott tells us: “[t]he sketch I have offered of the 
process of constructing gender relationships could be used to 
discuss class, race, ethnicity, or, for that matter, any social 
process.”38 Scott is right, but this does not diminish the discursive 
and expressive dimension of gender.  
Scott also provides a second proposition that specifically 
explores the political profile of what she thinks is specific to 
gender (without actually describing it as exclusive): its ability to 
articulate power relationships.  Scott explains: 
[G]ender is a primary field within which or by 
means of which power is articulated. Gender is not 
the only field, but it seems to have been a 
persistent and recurrent way of enabling the 
signification of power in the West, in Judeo-
Christian as well as Islamic traditions . . . . 
Established as an objective set of references, 
concepts of gender structure perception and the 
concrete and symbolic organization of all social 
life. To the extent that these references establish 
                                                          
38 Id. at 1069. 
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distributions of power (differential control over or 
access to material and symbolic resources) gender 
becomes implicated in the conception and 
construction of power itself.39 
Gender provides guidelines that naturalize and legitimize the 
distribution of power. It is a deeply (but not exclusively) political 
discourse.  
The political use of gender is not limited to the perceived 
sexual differences between men and women. Citing 
anthropologist Maurice Godelier, Scott argues that differences 
between the sexes are often invoked in relation to social 
phenomena that have nothing to do with sexuality but by being 
attached to sex differences, become socially legitimate.40 That is, 
gender serves as a key to interpreting social relations that have 
nothing to do with sexuality, and legitimizes them. As Scott 
explains, “Gender has been employed literally or analogically in 
political theory to justify or criticize the reign of monarchs and to 
express the relationship between ruler and ruled.”41 She goes on: 
Gender is one of the recurrent references by which 
political power has been conceived, legitimated, 
and criticized. It refers to but also establishes the 
meaning of the male/female opposition. To 
vindicate political power, the reference must seem 
sure and fixed, outside human construction, part of 
the natural or divine order. In that way, the binary 
opposition and the social process of gender 
relationships both become part of the meaning of 
power itself; to question or alter any aspect 
                                                          
39 Id. 
40 Id. (citing Maurice Godelier, The Origins of Male Domination, 127 
NEW LEFT REV. 17 (1981)). For Scott, the legitimizing role of gender is 
manifested in many forms and is supported by multiple instances in which 
economic and political organization of a society, or a particular historical 
phenomenon, such as American colonial domination or medieval spirituality, is 
articulated in terms of the distinctions between men and women and 
understood as natural differences. Cf. id. at 1070. 
41 Id. 
2014.05.01 MADRAZO.DOCX 5/5/2014  1:53 PM 
 GENDER AND (RELIGIOUS) ATTIRE 577 
threatens the entire system.42 
Gender is so embedded within the symbolic language of 
power that the enterprise of problematizing gender is necessarily 
a political one. Gender is political in both the strict and expansive 
sense of the word: it configures power relationships between 
individuals—whether in the bedroom, at school, in the office, or 
in court—and power is frequently read in terms of gender. In 
short, gender is an expression and, significantly, a political 
expression in all its senses. 
 
 B. The Protection of Gender as Expression 
 
There are valid reasons to protect gender as an expression. 
Whether gender is manifested linguistically or through behavior, 
it reflects and informs interpretations of what we are as men and 
women (or, neither one nor the other). Equally important, gender 
is an important political expression.  
The richness of the analysis that stems from the premise that 
gender is an expression can be perceived from two perspectives: 
whether we are trying to reaffirm a dominant gender role, or if 
we are trying to question a dominant gender role. In both cases, 
gender as expression must be preliminarily protected. In the end, 
however, such protection can be curtailed or even defeated 
depending on various issues, such as the possible or actual 
silencing effect of that expression on others. 
Some gender expressions reaffirm established gender roles. 
The controversy over the use of the headscarves by Muslim 
women in certain public spaces in Western Europe has been 
widely discussed, specifically the legal ban on the use of head 
scarves by Muslim students in French schools. Most frequently, 
the matter has been analyzed as a conflict between the apparent 
discrimination that young women are subjected to in wearing the 
veil and their freedom of expression. Salazar and Gutiérrez take 
such an approach: “Such practices have a community-religious 
thrust, and according to the report of the Commission [Stasi, 
which conducted the preliminary work leading to prohibitive 
                                                          
42 Id. at 1073. 
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legislation] they run counter to the principle of equality between 
men and women because they put the latter in a situation of 
marginalization.”43 
Thus, the conflict has been (partially) understood as one 
between the young Muslim’s right to nondiscrimination, and the 
right to freedom of religion and religious speech. This approach 
is problematic from the onset. Who is understood as the title-
holder of the right to freedom of religion/religious speech? The 
Stasi Report, upon which the French legislation is justified, 
assumes that wearing the veil is most often not a girl’s voluntary 
decision, but an imposition by the girl’s parents and 
communities.44 The Legislature thus assumed that it is an 
expression or practice that is imposed, not chosen. As noted by 
Salazar and Gutierrez, this assumption dissolves the conflict: 
there isn’t really a protected right to freedom of religion or 
speech, since the speech/practice is not free.45 Under this 
assumption, the veil should be banned because it violates two of 
the fundamental rights of Muslim girls: nondiscrimination and 
free speech. 
The problem is that the presumption that the headscarf is an 
imposition needs to be proven. Denying, ex ante, these girls’ 
autonomy and attributing their religious expression not to them, 
but to their parents and communities, is a rhetorical and 
argumentative resource without empirical proof for such a 
supposition. Such proof can only be determined on a case-by-case 
basis, not through a general mandate. It may well be the case that 
such practices are imposed, coerced, or not voluntary, but the 
state should not presume so.  
The controversy surrounding headscarves can be analyzed in 
a much more useful manner if the issue is rephrased as a conflict 
between two competing claims, both of which are grounded in 
freedom of speech: the expressive act of women who wear 
headscarves and the State’s interest in promoting gender equality. 
                                                          
43 Ugarte & Rivas, supra note 13, at 75. 
44  COMMISSION DE REFLEXION SUR L’APPLICATION DU PRÍNCIPE DE 
LAÏCITÉ DANS LA RÉPUBLIQUE, RAPPORT AU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
46–47 (2003). 
45 Id. at 76. 
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To understand the first of these claims, we need first to ask 
ourselves if there is an important inaccuracy in how the 
expressive behavior of wearing the headscarf has been 
understood. Using a headscarf cannot be cast as an exclusively 
religious practice. Further empirical work is needed to better 
understand the phenomenon, but arguably, wearing a headscarf 
also expresses something about a woman’s gender role. The 
headscarf says something about the wearer as a woman as much 
as it expresses something about her as a Muslim. Women wear 
the headscarf because they are Muslim women, not just because 
they are Muslim, period. Therefore, the veil is linked with how 
(Muslim) women relate to others as women. That the veil has as 
much to do with the fact of being a woman than with the fact of 
being a Muslim is illustrated by some countries, such as Saudi 
Arabia, Southern Sudan, and Iran, all (post-pubescent) women 
must be covered in public, whether they are Muslim. Of course, 
in cases in which women are forced to wear the veil, it may not 
be deemed an expressive act to be protected by free speech, but 
the point is that headgear is used by women because they are 
women, not exclusively or even necessarily because they are 
Muslim. For example, Muslim men do not wear headscarves, 
either at home or in public spaces. In addition, the profession of 
the Islamic faith is not represented directly by the headscarf: the 
headscarf does not have the same function among Muslims that 
the cross has among Catholics.  The headscarf is not a symbol of 
the faith; non-Muslims are expected to wear it in certain contexts. 
The analogy is imprecise (and Christian-centric). The headscarf 
expresses something about what women are (or should be) and 
how they interact with men, with people outside their homes, and 
generally in public spaces, because they are women. 
On the other hand, the State has a legitimate claim to promote 
both secularism and equal treatment between men and women and 
may deem that, in certain contexts, headscarves undermine both. 
Removing a practice that may hinder the achievement of a 
legitimate state interest in strategic contexts (such as schools 
where the young are in the process of defining their identity in 
the midst of their broader community) can be held to be 
legitimate. When banning headscarves from schools, the State is 
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sending a powerful message: at school, a space in which the 
young acquire what are deemed to be necessary and shared 
abilities and knowledge, religious and gender-biased attire is out 
of place; what we all share in common cannot accept gender (or 
religious) cleaving. Women, the State is saying, should not 
present themselves to their peers as women first, and then as 
peers. Rather, they should be deemed peers on equal footing first 
and foremost. In a gender-biased world, literally covering women 
singles them out and skews the way their interactions are 
received. The State’s message can be seen as analogous to the 
policy of banning smoking from non-enclosed areas in 
educational facilities: such a ban has more to do with protecting 
the young from seeing—and potentially emulating—adults who 
are authority figures engage in destructive behavior than with 
protecting them from second-hand smoke. In banning all smoking 
from educational facilities the State conveys to the young a 
powerful message regarding smoking.  
The conflict we are concerned with should thus be recast as 
follows: on one hand, the state has an interest in communicating 
the importance of secularism and substantive equality between 
men and women; on the other hand, young Muslim women 
wearing a face veil46 are expressing speech that seeks to convey 
something about what they are, should be, or should appear as 
(i.e., something about their gender role). Under this framework, 
the State’s prohibition of headscarves is a message in favor of 
secularism and equality between men and women. Muslim 
women conceive of the headscarf as an expression of something 
about their identity as women, rather than (only as) exercising a 
religious practice or expressing (exclusively) something about 
their religion. Such tension between the state and the Muslim 
women can be resolved by working from a common platform: 
free speech.  
The dispute is symbolic and discursive. To reframe the 
conflict in these terms does not require a particular solution. It 
                                                          
46 I assume here that the expression of wearing a headscarf is voluntary.  
If not, there is no possible case for constitutional protection, at least not under 
the doctrine of freedom of speech. 
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could conceivably be argued that the state has a legitimate and 
compelling interest, or, indeed, an obligation, to promote 
secularism among its youth. One method the state could use is 
suppressing any symbol associated with (though not necessarily 
expressive of) a religion that distinguishes people by creed. For 
instance, Article III of the Mexican Constitution explicitly 
commands secular education.47 But one could also argue that 
young Muslim women in France have the right to express, 
through the use of the headscarf, whatever they consider they are 
or should be as women. In any case, it seems that young Muslim 
women wearing the headscarf in school are expressing a view in 
France when wearing the headscarf in accordance with the 
established gender role in their cultural and religious 
environment. This is gender as speech, and it should be 
protected. 
In casting the dispute this way—as (state) speech versus 
(women’s) speech—the resolution can operate under the same 
principle and seek the same goal: safeguarding freedom of 
speech, promoting diversity, and plurality of positions in matters 
of public concern. For example, the solution could be tailored to 
both protect Muslim girls’ gender expression from being 
suppressed, and authorize the state to manifest the importance of 
secular education and substantive equality between men and 
women. This solution could propose, not impose, that women—
Muslim or not—need not accept a gender role that requires them 
to hide part of their body. Banning the headscarf would be 
unconstitutional, but the state could express—through other 
means—its desire for gender equality and secular public 
institutions. For instance, taking into consideration the age of the 
girls and their educational environment, the weighing of rights 
may favor the elimination of gender distinctions in their entirety, 
including those most accepted in French society. The State could, 
for instance, impose a policy in which both men and women use a 
standardized uniform consisting, for example, of shorts or long 
                                                          
47 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as 
amended Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO] , 5 de Febrero de 1917, art. III. 
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robes.48 In any case, it is important to recognize that when the 
headscarf is freely taken and not imposed, Muslim women are 
expressing something about what they understand they are and 
something they understand women to be. While no fundamental 
right is absolute and the right to the free expression of gender can 
still be defeated depending on the circumstances, it is important 
to recognize gender’s expressive dimension. 
Another example that helps to clarify the importance of 
understanding the problem of gender under the freedom of speech 
conceptual architecture is where gender roles are controverted, 
not reaffirmed, by expressive behaviors: notably the case for 
same-sex marriage. One of the dominant expectations deriving 
from gender roles is that in most societies, women must be 
attracted to men, and men to women. Homosexuality counters 
this aspect of gender roles in our societies. Women who are 
attracted to other women and men who are attracted to other men 
are still often regarded as deviants, both from what is expected, 
and from the accepted virtues of their gender. 
In Mexico City, the Legislative Assembly established the 
legal institution of domestic partnership (sociedad de convivencia) 
in 2006.49 This institution gave partners most (some would argue 
all) of the rights and obligations that marriage gives to spouses. A 
few years later, in 2009,50 the same legislative body decided to go 
further and change the definition of marriage in order to eliminate 
the requirement that the two people marrying be a man and a 
woman, thus legalizing same-sex marriages (and adoption).  
In Mexico, why were domestic partnerships not enough? In 
Mexico City, the rights linked to sustenance, successions, 
interdictions, and even adoption do not differ greatly between 
marriage and domestic partnerships.51  Adoption—–which drew 
                                                          
48 This proposal, of course, may have other serious constitutional 
problems itself. 
49 Ley de Sociedades de Convivencia, GODF (Nov. 16, 2006). 
50 Decreto por el que se reforman diversas disposiciones del Código Civil 
para el Distrito Federal y del Código de Procedimientos Civiles para el 
Distrito Federal, GODF, 525–26 (Dec. 29, 2009). 
51 See Código Civil para el Distrito Federal [CC] [Federal Civil Code], 
Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DO], arts. 391, 392. 
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most energy of the ensuing debate—was not the reason because 
domestic partnership law was tailored to allow adoption by same-
sex couples.52 Seemingly, what justified and, more important, 
motivated the legalization of same-sex marriage in Mexico City 
(where the legal functional equivalent to marriage already 
existed), was the expressive dimension of the institution of 
marriage. Marriage has an important expressive function as a 
symbolic role. Couples communicate their commitment through 
the act of getting married. They do so to each other, to their 
communities, and to the state. If marriage did not have a 
communicative, expressive, and celebratory function, most 
couples would marry before the Civil Registry (i.e., Town Hall) 
as if they were getting driver’s licenses (some do, certainly). 
Most people get married for its symbolic value and because of 
what marriage represents. Few couples are primarily concerned 
with, or even aware of, the legal implications of getting married. 
In many cases, what matters—at least when you’re getting 
married—is to communicate the existence of the union rather than 
to regulate it by law. Getting married and establishing a domestic 
partnership are acts which say different things to the people 
involved and to society. It is not a difference in importance, but a 
difference in kind.  
Marriage as a speech act is protected under freedom of 
speech. The demand that same-sex marriages be recognized tells 
society something about the purported “deviant” character of 
homosexuality. Namely that if the law itself recognizes the equal 
legitimacy and status of a homosexual union in relation to a 
heterosexual union, it is saying that homosexuality is not or 
should not be understood as a deviation or variation. A gay 
couple that gets married is through that act saying something to 
society: our union is as legitimate, and in the same ways, that 
                                                          
52 Article V of the Domestic Partnership Law for the Federal District 
equates partners with common law marriage for all legal purposes, while 
Articles 391 and 392 of the Civil Code for the Federal District equates 
common law spouses and formal spouses on the matter of adoption. Ley de 
Sociedades de Convivencia, GODF, art. V (Nov. 16, 2006); see also Código 
Civil para el Distrito Federal [CC] [Federal Civil Code], Diario Oficial de la 
Federacion [DO], arts. 391, 392. 
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heterosexual unions are. Through marriage, homosexual couples 
have a vehicle to contest the gender roles they challenge and are 
still often imposed on them. In this regard, the state has a 
constitutional obligation to give homosexual couples access to the 
means of expression through marriage. This is due not only, or 
not even mainly, because of right to nondiscrimination, (after all, 
one could argue that in terms of personal and property rights, the 
domestic partnership equates or can equate homosexuals and 
heterosexuals), but because of the protection of the right to 
freedom of speech. 
The state has an obligation to allow diversity of expressions 
linked to gender roles, and fulfill its obligation by extending the 
use of marriage as a form of expression, particularly for those 
who express gender roles that diverge from dominant ones. That 
is, especially to those who bring diversity to the “market place of 
ideas”53 about gender relations. Same-sex marriage should be 
constitutionally analyzed as expression through opposition of 
established gender roles, in addition to being analyzed under 
fundamental rights to equality, nondiscrimination, protection of 
the family, health, etc. Both wearing a headscarf and getting 
married are communicative acts that deserve constitutional 
protection under the right to freedom of speech. 
 
C. Expressions about Gender 
 
Starting from the democratic model of freedom of speech, the 
state’s function as moderator is particularly relevant. The state 
must seek to eliminate or mitigate the silencing effect of speech 
of some individuals in order to protect the speech of others.  
Gender as an expression (particularly, but not exclusively, the 
behaviors and gender expressions that contradict established 
gender roles) must be protected when other expressions regarding 
gender threaten to silence it. The silencing effect is accentuated to 
the extent that the silencing expression disqualifies or intimidates 
others. Disqualifying a speaker (that is, labeling him or her as not 
apt for participation in the debate or expressive act)—to the extent 
                                                          
53 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 56 (1953). 
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that it says something about the speaker and not about the matter 
under discussion—has a particularly potent and harmful silencing 
effect, and contributes little or nothing to the general discussion.  
For example, in the days following passage of the same-sex 
marriage law in Mexico City, Mexican Archbishop Norberto 
Rivera made several controversial declarations. He stated:  
[The legislative reform that allows same-sex 
marriages] has opened the gates to a deviant 
possibility which allows these couples to adopt 
innocent children, whose right to have a family 
built by a mother and a father will not be 
respected, with the consequential psychological 
and moral damage that this injustice and 
arbitrariness will therefore cause . . . . 
The Church considers an aberration to compare 
the union between same sex persons with 
marriage, because these are not able to reach the 
ends that gave origin to this essential institution 
that for Christians doesn’t just follow a form of 
social organization, but it is rather the order 
instituted by God since the creation of the world, 
and above the divine will that rules over the 
morality of marriage, no human law can be.54 
Rhetorically, same-sex couples are labeled as deviant and 
aberrant, and portrayed as a threat, not to the Archbishop, but to 
the innocent children who risk being adopted by them. 
Furthermore, same-sex couples are disqualified because of their 
fundamental betrayal of their gender roles: a person should be 
attracted to the opposite sex because the objective of sexual 
intercourse must be reproduction, which same sex couples can’t 
achieve (by themselves, the Archbishop should have qualified). 
The Archbishop attributes to marriage a necessary goal that by its 
(divinely ordained) nature excludes same sex couples.55  
                                                          
54 Gabriel Leon Zaragoza, Inmorales y aberrantes, las reformas 
aprobadas: Norberto Rivera, PERIÓDICO LA JORNADA, Dec. 22, 2009,  
at 29, available at http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2009/12/22/capital/029n2cap 
(emphasis added). 
55 Id. 
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The Archbishop’s statements exemplify normative doctrines 
to which Scott makes reference:56 they present the Archbishop’s 
interpretation of symbols that give value to institutions 
(marriages) as naturally truthful and therefore invulnerable to 
criticism.  With this, the statements render impossible any 
interpretation of alternative choices. Thus, the Archbishop’s 
statements reinforce the monopoly of dominant ideas over the 
meaning of institutions; in this case, marriage. These statements 
create an interpretation of marriage that seeks to eliminate the 
opinions of the Archbishop’s rivals.  
I doubt the Archbishop’s statements inhibited openly gay 
couples from getting married. I also doubt that homosexuals in 
Mexico ceased being homosexual because of what was said by the 
Church prelate. Nevertheless, I believe that, at least among the 
Catholic homosexual population of Mexico, the Archbishop’s 
statements will make some couples or persons refrain from 
expressing their intimate commitments to each other through 
marriage. This is due in no small part to the message itself. In his 
message, the Archbishop threatens homosexuals, at least those 
that are believers in his faith, to adopt the behavior that he 
expects from them: he states that same-sex persons’ marriages 
“have no future” because homosexuals that desire to get united 
under this scheme are “too few.”57  
If we accept the democratic model of freedom of speech, in 
which the state has to intervene by limiting a dominant speaker so 
as to ensure that others are not excluded from collective 
deliberation, normative consequences follow: under this model, 
the state should protect expression (i.e., the questioning of the 
role of gender established through the celebration of a marriage 
between people of the same sex) by restricting or containing (not 
suppressing)58 the Archbishop’s message, and thereby attenuating 
                                                          
56 See supra Part III.A.  
57 See Zaragoza, supra note 54, at 29.  
58 By suppression, I mean the act of silencing or restricting expression. 
Intervention refers to actions seeking to regulate the manner and channel 
through which expressions are transmitted. Contention means actions geared 
toward countering the impact of the message, without affecting the message 
itself, or the manner in which it is transmitted. This may be a positive act, 
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his disqualifications and threats. The effect of the threatening and 
disqualifying tone of Archbishop Rivera’s statements on same-sex 
couples, especially Catholics, that may want to express 
themselves through the celebration of a civil marriage, is that of 
inhibition.59 To prevent this inhibition the state must provide 
some form of remedy to counter the Archbishop’s statements. 
This could take the form of a monetary fine—symbolically 
communicating that the Archbishop’s statements were 
reprehensible and impinged upon other’s rights—the demand of a 
public apology, or the promotion of the use of marriage by same-
sex couples who wish to publicly express their commitments.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION: PROTECTING GENDER SPEECH THAT 
REINFORCES GENDER ROLES AS A FORM OF EMPOWERMENT  
 
Regardless of the analytic soundness of the offered 
framework, individuals interested in advancing gender equality 
and challenging gender roles should strategically favor protecting 
expressive practices (such as wearing a headscarf), even if such 
practices reinforce traditional gender roles. 
If we frame the issue of religious attire (e.g., headscarves) as 
one in which freedom of religion confronts gender inequality, 
then there are two possibilities. Either the title holder of the right 
in tension with gender equality is a religious community 
(wherever collective rights are ascribed to such groups); or else 
the title holder is a woman in so far as she is a member of that 
religious community. This means that the right is held by the 
community, as a community, and is protected as long as it 
conforms to that community’s preexistent internal rules. By 
contrast, if we cast the question as a matter of free speech on 
                                                          
such as subsidizing rivaling speech. An example of suppression would be 
direct censorship. An example of intervention or restriction would be where 
and when the message can be transmitted (i.e., not in schools). And an 
example of contention would be, for instance, government subsidy to feminist 
porn (as an alternative to banning pornography deemed to be a form of 
violence against women). 
59 Under Mexican law, only civil marriages confer legal status; thus, the 
Archbishop can only inhibit, not prohibit, gay Catholics from marrying.   
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both sides of the equation, then the title holder of the fundamental 
right is the woman as an individual. Conceptually, this makes her 
the person entitled to decide whether or how to exercise the right. 
If the fundamental right at stake is freedom of religion, then 
wearing a headscarf is a practice that is both rigid and reified, 
insofar as it is part of the paraphernalia or practices that are 
protected because it is embedded in tradition, or according to the 
religious groups’ rules and hierarchies. Instead, free speech is a 
practice that is far more ductile: an expressive act emitted by an 
individual who wishes to convey a message, but can choose to do 
so in a different manner, through different forms of expression. 
As to the effect each framework has with regard to the 
woman herself, the two could not be more different. Framing the 
matter as one involving religious freedom requires that the 
woman conform to the religious practice of her community in 
order to enjoy constitutional protection. Instead, if the matter is 
framed from the perspective of free speech then the woman is 
empowered independently of her community. Discussing her 
actions as expressions of freedom of religion subsumes the 
woman into her religious community, making her an instantiation 
of a group practice and, thus, disempowers her vis-a-vis the 
group. Her actions are not hers, but the community’s. The 
community’s rights (practices, beliefs) are protected; the woman 
is not responsible for her actions but merely an object of the 
group’s traditions. However, casting her actions as an exercise in 
free speech, in contrast, simultaneously empowers her vis-a-vis 
both the state and any other entity—including her religious 
community—and holds her responsible for such actions. She 
chooses how to express her gender role, so she is responsible for 
such expressions.  
In the end, I believe that the most powerful reason to prefer 
freedom of speech is the same reason why freedom of speech is 
valuable in the first place: because it provides a minimum 
safeguard for diversity in collective interaction. When wearing a 
headscarf is cast as valuable or protected because it is the time-
honored religious practice of a group, such action actually 
contributes to stifling diversity both within and without religious 
communities. It stifles diversity between religious communities 
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because it requires that either a religious community entrench 
itself to defend a specific practice or else succumb to the 
majoritarian perspective (for example, secularism—as in France—
or gender equality). Casting the choice to wear a headscarf as a 
religious practice also stifles diversity within religious 
communities because, in identifying the practice as belonging to a 
community, it fixes the practice and protects it only insofar as it 
is recognized as a collective practice. This view assumes that the 
message conveyed by the practice is inherently important to the 
religious community as a whole, disallowing the claim of 
dissenting messages within the community as legitimately 
expressing the community’s identity.  
In contrast, framing the matter as a question of free speech, 
by establishing that individual women—not the religious 
communities themselves—are the title holders of the right in 
question, protects diversity both within and outside the religious 
community. It does within the community, because it empowers 
the individual women as the right holders, and thus, the actors 
capable of demanding state protection. Outside the community 
this view protects a specific message regarding gender roles—the 
roles according to the status quo within the religious 
community—from being stifled by the broader status quo, which 
sees the gender roles conveyed and sanctioned by that community 
as unacceptable. For these reasons, I argue, approaching the 
tension between gender equality and religious attire is best done 
through free speech, at least for those of us committed to 
empowering women. 
It is important to keep in mind that the broad doctrinal 
structures through which we frame specific problems do not 
determine specific outcomes. Regardless of how one frames the 
question, legally, the solution to the problem at hand can be 
constructed so that headscarves can or cannot be banned under 
law. However, choosing the framework does matter because it 
determines who the protagonist is—the individual women or the 
religious community—and what the value at stake is, freedom and 
diversity, or religion and tradition. While framing is not 
everything, it can determine much and is especially useful to 
describe and explain which issues are truly problematic and in 
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what sense.   
In the end, the strongest case for protecting women who wear 
religious attire in public spaces stems from the importance of 
allowing women themselves to say and do what they feel they 
should as women. It is a question of taking women at their word, 
through what they are saying and through their actions. 
Respecting women’s speech, whatever manner in which it takes, 
is something to which those of us who agree with the fundamental 
claims of feminism should always be committed.  
 
